Public Bill Committee

[Frank Cook in the Chair]
CJ 26 Caroline Beasley-Murray
CJ 27 Information Commissioner
CJ 27a Information Commissioner (additional)

Bridget Prentice: I beg to move,
That the Order of the Committee of 3 February be amended as follows:
(1) in paragraph (1) of the Order of the Committee of 3 February, there shall be inserted at the end
(h) at 10.30 am and 4.00 pm on Tuesday 10 March;;
(2) in paragraph (4) of that Order, for 4.00 pm on Thursday 5 March there shall be substituted 10.00 pm on Tuesday 10 March.
Following discussions through the usual channels with my hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham and the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth, the House has agreed to extend the Committee stage of the Bill by a day on Tuesday 10 March. The motion makes the necessary consequential change to the programme order adopted by the Committee at its first sitting. Next Tuesday, we shall sit until 10 pm, and I am convinced that that additional time will be enough to complete the scrutiny of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 61

Investigation anonymity orders

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment 78, in clause 61, page 35, line 14, leave out justice of the peace and insert Crown Court judge.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 80, in clause 62, page 36, line 31, leave out justice of the peace and insert Crown Court judge.
Amendment 81, in clause 62, page 37, line 9, leave out justice and insert judge.
Amendment 130, in clause 62, page 37, line 11, leave out justice of the peace and insert Crown Court judge.
Amendment 131, in clause 62, page 37, line 12, leave out justice of the peace and insert Crown Court judge.
Amendment 132, in clause 62, page 37, line 14, leave out justice and insert judge.
Amendment 133, in clause 62, page 37, line 16, leave out justice of the peace and insert Crown Court judge.
Amendment 134, in clause 62, page 37, line 17, leave out from to to end of line 18 and insert
such person as the Secretary of State may by order prescribe in respect of the relevant county court.
Amendment 135, in clause 63, page 37, line 26, leave out justice of the peace and insert Crown Court judge.
Amendment 136, in clause 63, page 38, line 10, leave out justice and insert judge.
Amendment 137, in clause 64, page 38, line 19, leave out justice of the peace and insert Crown Court judge.
Amendment 84, in clause 64, page 38, line 20, leave out Crown and insert High.
Amendment 138, in clause 64, page 38, line 25, leave out justice and insert Crown Court judge.
Amendment 139, in clause 64, page 38, line 27, leave out justice of the peace and insert Crown Court judge.
Amendment 140, in clause 65, page 38, line 34, leave out justice of the peace and insert Crown Court judge.
Amendment 141, in clause 65, page 38, line 35, leave out justice and insert judge.
Amendment 142, in clause 65, page 38, line 36, leave out justice and insert judge.
Amendment 85, in clause 65, page 39, line 5, leave out Crown and insert High.
Amendment 143, in clause 65, page 39, line 5, leave out justices decision and insert decision of the Crown Court judge.
Amendment 144, in clause 65, page 39, line 7, leave out justice of the peace and insert Crown Court judge.
Amendment 145, in clause 68, page 40, line 15, leave out paragraph (a).
Amendment 146, in clause 68, page 40, line 20, at end insert
(d) the reference to the High Court is to be read as a reference to the High Court of Northern Ireland;
(e) the reference to a judge of the High Court is to be read as a reference to a judge of the High Court of Northern Ireland..
Amendment 191, in clause 69, page 40, line 25, after second a, insert Crown.
Amendment 192, in clause 69, page 40, line 27, after first the, insert Crown.
Amendment 193, in clause 69, page 41, line 1, after the, insert Crown.
Amendment 195, in clause 70, page 41, line 11, at end insert
(A1) For the avoidance of doubt, whilst applications for a witness anonymity order must be made to the Crown court such orders may govern current, adjourned or future proceedings in the magistrates courts..
Amendment 194, in clause 70, page 41, line 13, after the, insert Crown.
Amendment 201, in clause 80, page 45, line 35, after Appeal, insert
except where the Crown court is specified as the appropriate court,.

Edward Garnier: Amendment 78 stands in my name and those of my hon. Friends. I think that on this occasion my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire intends to leave his name on the amendment.

James Gray: I reconfirm that I will, of course, support all the amendments that my hon. and learned Friend proposes from now onwards. I am delighted to say that, with one exception, I have supported the Conservative Whip throughout my 12 years in this place, and I intend to do so for the next 12 years, too. I am glad that when I divided the Committee last week, both my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk and the Whip joined me in my Division.
Mr. Garnierrose

Tim Boswell: As we seem to be in the business of making confessions, the Committee will have noticed that my name is absent from the amendment. I give my hon. and learned Friend notice that I have, as the Scots would say, some doots about the matter, because I am a doughty supporter of the interests and the importance of magistrates, including the lay magistracy, but I have some confidence that I shall be persuaded by his eloquence.

Edward Garnier: It is always good to have friends.

Maria Eagle: Especially sitting behind you.

Edward Garnier: Exactly. I look forward to enjoying the support of my consistent but for one occasion hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire and my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry, who has what he called doots. We shall see what we can do about that.
This is quite a simple set of amendments. What I seek to do flows from the evidence that came out of the evidence sessions. I think that it was Mr. Keir Starmer, the Director of Public Prosecutions, who informed us that of the cases that had gone to the courts under the witness anonymity legislation passed in the summer, only three cases had gone before a magistrate, and that was a district judge rather than a lay magistrates bench. I appreciate that we are talking about investigation anonymity orders, but it strikes me that if the practice is that most applications for witness anonymity orders have gone to Crown court judges, the orders under clause 61 are also likely, on the great preponderance of occasions, to go before a Crown court judge. That will not necessarily be the case, but it is a fair guess.
It may be suggested that because these orders are made in the course of the investigatory stage, it is not possible to know whether the investigations will lead to a charge at all and, if they do lead to a charge, whether that charge will be dealt with most suitably before a magistrates court or a Crown court, but in any event, given the delicate nature of the jurisdiction

Alun Michael: On a point of order, Mr. Cook. Members of the public cannot attend our sitting. It seems that the door to the room has been left locked for some reason.

Frank Cook: The problem seems to be self-correcting.

Alun Michael: It has been left to members of the Committee to unlock the door.

Frank Cook: Well, we must grateful for the fact that some members of the Committee consider themselves to be doorkeepers.

Edward Garnier: It is always a pleasure to see the right hon. Gentleman helping us.
Given the delicate nature of the jurisdiction that we are creating, it is probably more sensible for the applications to be made to the Crown court rather than a magistrate. I, of course, accept that it is difficult to appreciate with certainty at the time of an investigation and when the police or the authorities are considering whether to make an application for an investigation anonymity order whether that investigation will lead to a charge and, if there were a charge, whether it will lead to proceedings in a Crown court or a magistrates court. In any event, I want to know whether the Government are convinced and think it wholly appropriate in all circumstances that such applications should be made to a magistrates court as opposed to a Crown court.

David Howarth: Like the hon. Member for Daventry, I have doubts about the proposal, but I wish first to declare an interest in so far as my wife is a magistrate. I have high regard for the work of magistrates in similar areas, such as the granting of search warrants. They undertake sensitive work and do so very well.
The downside of the orders is the number of people who get to know about the identity of the person whose identity the orders are intended to protect. How many more people will know the identity compared with the current position, when the police assure the potential witness that they will not let their name out? A formal process seems to carry with it the risk that more people will know identities rather than only the police officers conducting the investigation. The amendment tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough raises the problem whether more people would get to know if the order were made by the Crown court than by the magistrates court. I fear that, given the formality surrounding Crown courts, that more extraneous people would be in the know, if the proposal were adopted.

Maria Eagle: The amendments all concentrate on restricting the making of an investigation anonymity order through a Crown court judge rather than a justice of the peace or a district judge at a magistrates court in Northern Ireland. As has been anticipated by the hon. and learned Gentleman and the hon. Member for Cambridge, the provision is designed as a tool for the police when investigating gang-related, gun-and-knife homicides, so the point at which an order would be made would be earlier than in respect of witness anonymity orders, which are designed to deal with trial situations. The reason given by the hon. and learned Gentlemen for tabling the amendmentsthe related statsis not as compelling as we might think, simply because of the earlier stage. Indeed, he anticipated that that would be one my arguments.
We believe that the amendments are unnecessary because, in many ways, JPs are generally more experienced in dealing with matters relating to police investigations; and the hon. Member for Cambridge has said that arrest and search warrants are often issued by JPs, as well as warrants for further detention in police custody. Indeed, early orders in respect of investigations are already part of the magistrates experience.
We believe that it is undesirable to limit those powers to Crown court judges. The idea is to provide a speedy local service to assist the police in providing reassurance to witnesses who might otherwise not come forward with evidence at the very beginning of an investigation, which is often the most crucial time for ensuring that homicide cases can be solved. We believe that no issues of liberty arise at that early stage. It is about offering the reassurance that identities will be kept secret; there is no prospect of criminal proceedings being instituted as a result. We therefore believe that it would be wrong to exclude JPs and magistrates, because we have every confidence that they are perfectly capable, and perhaps more experienced, when dealing with such issues.

Tim Boswell: If the provision goes through, will the Minister at least undertake to monitor its operation effectively, to see whether the advantages in speed and localism that she has identified outweigh any alleged disadvantage from consistency of practice or some other judicial failing?

Maria Eagle: Yes. We would do that in any event, and the CPS and the police will be collecting statistics. However, we will keep the workings of the order under review, were the Committee and the House to put it on the statute book as we wish.
I do not believe that the potential drawbacks mentioned by the Committee will become real. I have every confidence that the magistracy and JPs are perfectly capable, and that they have more experience of dealing with such matters than the Crown court. We therefore believe that the advantages will outweigh the disadvantages. However, the proof will be in what happens, so we will keep an eye on things. None the less, I do not believe that the concerns raised by the hon. and learned Gentleman are such that we should consider accepting his amendment. I hope that he agrees, and that he will find it possible to withdraw it.

Edward Garnier: This has been a short debate, and deliberately so. I was almost amused a moment ago, thinking that the Minister was about to say that the proof of the pudding is in the eating.

Maria Eagle: Plum duff.

Edward Garnier: The Minister saw the horrors of plum duff appearing before her, but she resisted the temptation. Nevertheless, she was right to think of plum duff, because it is an apt analogy for the Bill.
I wish to calm the fears of my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry and others. The Conservative party is a doughty supporter, defender and promoter of the ancient office and functions of the lay magistracy. When the Minister said that the advantage of keeping the applications before the magistrate is that it can provide a speedy local service, I was reminded of the number of magistrates courts that have been closed or threatened with closure under this Government. As a result, it may not be all that speedy, and it may not be all that local. However, I have every confidence that such magistrates as remain will provide an excellent service.
As the Minister correctly pointed outif she did not, the hon. Member for Cambridge did, based on his wifes experience on the benchlay magistrates and district judges already deal with highly sensitive applications, including search warrants. Other applications, such as those under terrorism legislation or those relating to searching bank accounts and the production of bank records, are made to the Crown court. However, that does not matter; I am not sufficiently anxious about clause 61 to keep these issues away from the lay bench, and I am content to let the matter rest.
Finally, I want to deal, in so far as it needs to be dealt with, with a point made by the hon. Member for Cambridge about the number of people in the know. As he will perhaps appreciate, applications under the public interest immunity system are made in private to the Crown court judge, and the number of people in the know is determined on a need-to-know basis. Were applications under clause 61 reserved to the Crown court, a procedure operating on a similar need-to-know basis would be set up, although that will not happen as a result of my arguments. None the less, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Frank Cook: Before we come to the next group of amendments, I remind the Committee that my job is to listen to every word that is spoken. Under certain circumstances, I might choose not to hear them, but I have to listen to them. If I am to hear them clearly, however, it is better for them to be addressed in my direction, because my hearing is slightly impaired.

Maria Eagle: I beg to move amendment 268, in clause 61, page 35, line 16, leave out assisted or was and insert is or was able or.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 463, in clause 61, page 35, line 23, after information, insert is a police officer or.
Government amendments 269 to 274.
Amendment 440, in clause 61, page 36, line 8, leave out paragraph (a).
Amendment 441, in clause 61, page 36, line 12, leave out paragraph (c).
Amendment 442, in clause 61, page 36, line 15, leave out paragraph (d).
Government amendment 275.
Amendment 79, in clause 61, page 36, line 24, at end insert
and on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or to both..
Government amendment 276.
Clause stand part.
Government amendments 277 and 344.

Maria Eagle: Clause 61 provides that an investigation anonymity order is not contravened in certain specified circumstances, including where the disclosure of information is to a person employed in public administration. Following further consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers and the CPS on how the order will operate in practice, we have concluded that that exemption is no longer required. Government amendments 271, 274 and 276 therefore remove it.
ACPO intends that knowledge of a witness who is subject to an investigation anonymity order should, as one would hope, be kept within a very tight group, whose members need to know that information for the purpose of the investigation. We have been advised that the latest procedures in homicide investigations mean that there should be no contact with local authorities or others in public administration, certainly not in a form that would give away the witnesss details. In view of that, we have decided that the exemption in the original draft Bill is not necessary.
Government amendments 275 and 344 would remedy an administrative oversight, which the hon. and learned Member for Harborough has clearly spotted, given that his amendment 79 is on the same issue, and I am happy to answer any points that arise out of his exposition on that amendment.
Clause 61(11) provides for penalties for a person guilty of breaching an investigation anonymity order. Although it covers a person convicted on indictment, we have neglected to provide a penalty for a person on summary conviction. The offence is to be triable either way, so that is a bit of an oversight.
Government amendments 268 to 270, 272, 273 and 277 are minor drafting amendments.

Edward Garnier: I am grateful to the Minister for acknowledging the thrust of amendment 79, which seeks to add to subsection (11) the appropriate way of dealing with a summary conviction, in addition to the conviction on indictment. It is appropriate that it should be restored to the Bill, given the discussions that we have just had on the Governments and our own support for the magistrates system, so I do not need to say any more about that.
I am not sure to what extent the Minister anticipated or dealt with my amendments 440 to 442, but essentially what we want to find out from the Government why a person employed in public administration should be immune from the discipline of the scheme. I appreciate that paragraphs (8)(a) to (8)(d) are all wrapped up into one:
A person who discloses information to which an investigation anonymity order relates does not contravene the order if
(a) the person is employed in public administration,
(b) the information had been disclosed to the person for a purpose connected with the specified qualifying criminal investigation...
(c) the disclosure was made to another person who at the time of the disclosure was employed in public administration...and
(d) such disclosure was made for the purpose referred to in paragraph (b).
I can understand that. There may be officials within the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and other arms of the

Maria Eagle: It may have assisted the hon. and learned Gentleman if I had been clearer in moving the Government amendments, which remove those sections, which are not necessary. ACPO has explained in more detail the procedures that it intends to adopt, and so those exemptions are no longer necessary.

Edward Garnier: That serves me right for half listening to the Minister and half preparing the next four clauses. Thank you.

David Howarth: I want to speak to amendment 463, which is in my and my hon. Friends name. It is a deliberate probing amendment that asks a simple question: to whom will the offences in this part of the Bill apply? If, as the probing amendment proposes, police officers were immune from prosecution, who else would be liable to be found guilty of the offences? My reason for asking goes to the heart of my doubts about this part of the Bill. They are not doubts about the underlying severe problems with witness intimidation by gangs, especially in localised areas. My problem is whether the provisions will make any difference or any practical change as a result of passing these clauses, or whether it is a bit of symbolic legislation or yet another idea from ACPO that has not been properly thought through.
As I see it, it is envisaged that the police will say to a potential witness, We will protect your identity from being released to the target of the investigation. An order will then be made, and if the order is breached, that is a criminal offence. The question is, how is that different from what happens now? In reality, the police give assurances to potential witnesses and say, Your name will not come out as part of the investigation. Later on, we might have to apply for a witness anonymity order to keep your name out of the court, but while it is going on we will not let your name out. In fact, as a matter of law, even if, obviously, it is not often used, there is already civil liability, if the police give an assurance to a potential witness or a victim and then negligently allow their name to come out. Swinney v. Chief Constable of Northumbria Police Force 1996 shows clearly, at least in theory, that there is liability for negligence in such circumstances.

Maria Eagle: At the moment, witnesses do not come forward because they feel that they cannot be given any assurances about anonymity at such an early stage of an investigation. They realise that there might be anonymity at trial, but that is a long way off in the circumstances that we are talking about. Therefore, in practice, at the moment, witnesses do not come forward, and evidence that may help solve the crime is not given.

David Howarth: I still doubt whether the availability of the orders will be widely known to the general public and whether the orders will encourage anyone to come forward, given the circumstances in which assurances will be advanced by the police.

Tim Boswell: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that in too many cases in the past Governments have worthily aspired to some public good and legislated for it, but the legislation has not ipso facto removed the problem?

David Howarth: I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman. Too often, the Government imagine that passing a law will automatically solve a problem in the real world, but there is a difference between real world events and laws. Members of the public do not spend any time in their ordinary daily lives reading Acts of Parliament.

George Howarth: People may not notice the change in the law, but they will notice the change in practice. I had a conversation with a constituent on Monday morning who was under some stress because of attacks by local yobs. Her experience is that people do not allow themselves to become a witness in court, if they are unprotected. If she felt that the protections provided were sufficient to enable her to go to court, I am sure that she would do so.

David Howarth: I agree with the right hon. Gentleman, and I think he supports what I have said.

George Howarth: I do not.

David Howarth: The right hon. Gentleman thinks that he is not supporting what I have said, but in reality he is. What matters is the protection that witnesses believe that they will receive in reality, which is the key to the situation. Do people feel safe going to the police? Legislation does not make them feel safe, but the experience of other people on their estate in similar circumstances will.

George Howarth: It is not the change in the law that is important, but the practice that follows. That is a simple point, and I am at a loss why he cannot understand me.

David Howarth: I cannot understand the right hon. Gentleman because I do not think that any change of practice will automatically follow from the Bill, or that there will be any change of practice that could not be achieved without the Bill.

Jeremy Wright: May I put the point made by the right hon. Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East a different way? At the moment, the police are not in a position to tell a prospective witness at investigation stage that protection of their anonymity will be provided at that point. The Bill will mean that the police will be in a position to say at the investigation stage, Anonymity is available to you. That is the change in practice that I think the right hon. Gentleman is describing.

David Howarth: Absolutely, but what difference would that make? That is the point of amendment 463. Who are the potential offenders under the clause? The only plausible offenders are police officers. If members of the public do not trust the police to keep their names out of the public eye and away from the alleged offenders who might intimidate them, why would they do so under the provisions? That is why I do not think that it makes a lot of difference.
There have been cases where the police have a close relationship with journalists and the names go to the journalists, who then publish them, but that is rare. The Minister is making a facial expression to show that she agrees that it is not rare enough and that there is too much of that sort of thing going on. Nevertheless, even in that case, the offence will have been committed by police officers, because the information would have been given to the journalists by police officers. I suppose that in theory, it might, in some cases, be a police civilian employee, but it is usually a police officer who commits the offence.
The underlying question is why do the Government believe that members of the public, who do not trust the police now, will trust them any more if the only protection that they are being offered is a criminal offence that the police, and virtually no-one else, commit? The police will then have to take proceedings against themselves. If one has little confidence in the police, then I cannot see what practical difference the provision will, in reality, makeeven though I hope that it does.

Maria Eagle: I will try to deal with the point made by the hon. Member for Cambridge in respect of amendment 463. I understand the point that he is making. Apart from police officers, anyone who is involved in preparing the prosecution might be affected, such as prosecutors and the Serious Organised Crime Agency. However, it is essentially correct that the provision will affect those preparing the case at an early stage during the investigation. The hon. Gentleman is right about that.
I assure the hon. Gentleman that this is not some half-baked idea that has come from ACPO, as he seems to be suggestingACPO has said that it thinks the measure might help. However, we are restricting the provision to the most serious end of gun-and-gang homicide, with knives and guns. Those are the sorts of cases where the concern that witnesses have in particular areas affected by this type of crime prevents them from coming forward to give evidence at an early stage, even though evidence is available. The evidence shows that there are hot-spot areas around the country. My right hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East knows as well as me, because we represent some of those areas, precisely what fear exists and the situations that can arise from gang-related activity in particular places.
One of the reasons why we are restricting the provisionwe had this debate at the end of the previous sittingis to see whether it works. I am not saying that it will definitely work, but we need to do more to ensure the rule of law in hot spots for gangs and crime. We believe that the provision may help and we hope that it will, as does the hon. Gentleman. I welcome the fact that he hopes that it will work, but I am not going to proclaim that it definitely will. If it works, that will be a good thing, but if it does not work, it will not be extended and may even fall into disuse. However, I do not believe, as someone who represents an area which is affected in this wayI am sure that I speak for my hon. Friendsthat we should throw up our hands in despair and do nothing, when we see a situation that we think might be helped positively by the measure.
On that basis, while I understand the somewhat academic points that the hon. Gentleman makesI am not insulting himI hope that he understands where we are coming from.

David Howarth: These points are not academic. They are based on my personal experience of being brought up on an estate rather like the one the Minister is talking about. My points have nothing to do with intellectual game playing, because they concern what is really going to happen in real life. My doubts concern the political game by which the Government want to appear to do something about such a serious problem, but are not doing anything.

Maria Eagle: It is not a political game, but a practical effort to deal with a particular problem in specific hot-spot areas for gun-and-gang homicide. We hope and believe that the provision will make a difference. The hon. Gentleman has his doubts, whether academic or otherwise. I hope that we are right and that he is not, but to ensure that we do not infect the entire criminal justice system with anonymity at investigation stages, we are restricting our effort to make a positive difference to the highest level of offences in hot-spot, gun-and-gang-crime-ridden areas.

Amendment 268 agreed to.

Amendments made: 269, in clause 61, page 35, line 29, leave out from that to the in line 30 and insert
the information disclosed is information that might enable the specified person to be identified as a person of the sort described in subsection (1)(a) in relation to.
270, in clause 61, page 35, line 37, leave out from first is to willing and insert
a person who is or was able or.
271, in clause 61, page 35, line 41, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert
(a) the disclosure is made to a person who is involved in the specified qualifying criminal investigation or in the prosecution of an offence to which the investigation relates, and.
272, in clause 61, page 36, line 4, leave out was and insert is.
273, in clause 61, page 36, line 5, after prosecution, insert
of an offence to which the investigation relates.
274, in clause 61, page 36, line 6, leave out subsection (8).
275, in clause 61, page 36, line 22, leave out from liable to end of line 24 and insert 
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the relevant period or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine, or both.
(11A) The relevant period means
(a) in relation to England and Wales, 12 months;
(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, 6 months..
276, in clause 61, page 36, line 25, leave out subsection (12).(Maria Eagle.)

Clause 61, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 63

Conditions for making order

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment 82, in clause 63, page 37, line 31, leave out subsection (4).

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 443, in clause 63, page 37, line 34, leave out subsection (5).
Amendment 444, in clause 63, page 37, line 37, leave out subsection (6).
Amendment 83, in clause 63, page 37, line 40, leave out paragraph (b).
Amendment 445, in clause 63, page 38, line 9, leave out subsection (9).

Edward Garnier: Again, the debate can be reasonably short. Our amendments are intended to extract from the Government some understanding of the thinking behind the age limits and the composition of gangs. In case anyone gets over-excited, the amendments are probing.
The Government are providing that, for the purposes of the clause, those who commit qualifying offences or are suspected of committing qualifying offencesgang membersshould be between the ages of 11 and 30. The applications can be made ifgoing to subsection (9), which is affected by amendment 445the qualifying offence is committed by two or more persons.
Why did the Government choose those age limits 11 at the younger end and 30 at the older end? The right hon. Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East and the Minister may have constituency experience of unattractive people misconducting themselves in gangs who may be over the age of 30. They may be egging youngsters on, as gang leaders who are off the balance sheet and careful enough not to be seen on the ground but who, none the less, may be the controlling minds of such gangs. I appreciate that if a person is under the age of 11, they are close to the age of absence of criminal responsibility under the law. None the less, I think that the Government may shut themselves out of an avenue if they think that the regime under clause 61 and the following clauses is a good one. The age group will be limited to between 11 and 30, albeit that I accept that most gangs are probably of that age group; certainly, when I have visited prisonsI think, 50 or so in the past two and a half to three yearsmost of the residents who are there for gangland-related offences are of that age group.

Tim Boswell: Does my hon. and learned Friend agree that it is a problem where before the order is made, it has to appear that the majority of persons in the group are in the age group? Given that there is unlikely to be any formal, let alone recorded, structure, it will put a difficult evidential test to work out how many people there were, and who was the numerator and who was the denominator.

Edward Garnier: My hon. Friend has described the problem much more neatly than me. He has enabled me to cut short my remarks by some measure, which is a happy thing for the hon. Member for Wrexham. The Whips could be submarinersthe silent service. Occasionally they pop up above the surface and fire off something, and the hon. Member for Wrexham has just done that. Returning to my point, my hon. Friend and I have described the issue, which now requires an explanation from the Government.
On a further point, I may be misleading myself that I have properly read subsection (9), but I want to be sure that, where it states that the qualifying offence must be committed by two or more persons, it is sufficient for the purposes of subsection (2), which will give the JP the power to make an order if they are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the relevant conditions in subsections (3) to (8) have been satisfied by one person. It may be that it is too early in the morning for my brain to engage properly with the matter, but I need to have the numbers sorted out. Does the court need only to be satisfied that one person has committed a relevant offencealbeit that they are a member of a gang of two or moreor is there something else that I have missed through my lack of acuity?

David Howarth: I have little to add to what the hon. and learned Gentleman has said, except to point out that his last point relates to the failure of the Government to take on the whole reform of the law on murder. Dealing with secondary parties to murder was originally part of the Law Commissions task, and the Government have abandoned that effortalthough, given the reaction to the commissions proposals, perhaps it is not quite as surprising as what else happened.
Like the hon. Member for Daventry, I am slightly worried about exactly how the magistrate will approach an application where the conditions are so detailedthe person involved has to be aged at least 11, but under 30, at the time of the offence. It does not say appears to be or would, on reasonable grounds, we believe to be; it says are, which seems too precise. Although subsection (2) will allow a JP to make such an order, if they are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the conditions are fulfilled, the conditions tend to be precise, rather than slightly vaguer, which would be more appropriate.
More than that, there is a problem with the definition of gang, which looks arbitrary. Why is the cut-off age 30, and not 31 or 29? To pass this on rationality grounds, the Government at least need some evidence of the nature of gang crime and the age of the people involved. Like the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, I visit prisons, and I agree with him that most of the people involved in such activity are in their 20s or younger, but some gangs, especially the more organised ones involved in drug dealing, include slightly older people. I am worried, therefore, about why the cut-off is as it is.

Jeremy Wright: I seek your guidance, Mr. Cook. My point relates to clause 63(8), to which no amendments have been tabled. Do you intend to conduct a stand part debate? If so, would you prefer me to raise my point then, or now?

Frank Cook: I am inclined to request that any stand part comments be made at this time, because we are discussing four subsections, at least. Now is the moment, if the hon. Gentleman wants to take it.

Jeremy Wright: Subsection (8) deals with one of the conditions for the making of an investigation anonymity order. The first part of the subsection is perfectly straightforward and sensible: that the person in question be able to provide information of assistance. However, paragraph (b) causes me some concern, so I would be grateful for some clarification from the Minister. Paragraph (b) states that the person in question should be
more likely than not, as a consequence of the making of the order, to provide such information.
It is hard to conceive of an individual who might become a witness in proceedings, who would not be more persuaded to give information if given anonymity. What is the purpose of paragraph (b)? It seems to me that there are two possible approaches: the Government could say either that all those who wish to have an investigation anonymity order, in the context of the other conditions in the clause, should be able to have one, or that only those who need such an orderthose who would not give the information requested without such an ordershould be covered.

Tim Boswell: Is not the problem with subsection (8) that it puts in place an objective test, whereas clearly it is the wishes and intentions of the potential witness that are relevant? If there is to be an objective test, will it not need to be argued over in court subsequently, because there will be no evidence either way for whether it was better? As often seems to be the case to me, as a lay person in the legal process, we could end up arguing again about whether process has been fulfilled, without making any progress on the substance of the matter.

Jeremy Wright: I am not sure that I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. Whatever way it is done, this is a subjective test, because it is all about whether the person in question, who could provide information, would be willing to do so, if certain conditions are fulfilled and help offered. Currently, the subsection states that the order would be available if the person would be more likely to provide information. That is a question about whether that person is more persuaded. However, it seems to me that that test could easily be met. Everyone would be more persuaded to give evidence if given anonymity. What is the utility of the subsection, therefore, and what lies behind it? Why, if they have done so, have the Government concluded that that is a better approach than saying that such orders are available only to those who would not otherwise give useful information?

Maria Eagle: I shall try to deal with that latter point first. I am sure that the Committee will agree that it would not be desirable to spray around investigation anonymity orders willy-nilly. We all have concerns about anonymity. The purpose of subsection (3) is to make the point that if such an offer of support and assistance at an early stage persuades somebody to give evidence that might lead to a conviction for homicide in a gun-and-gang-related murder, for example, that makes it worth while to allow anonymity, which is always a compromise in the criminal justice system.
It may be that that person, because they are offered an anonymity order at an early stage, does not have to give evidence at the trial. The evidence that they offer might lead to the finding of the weapon, and forensic evidence might then be enough to tie the weapon to the individual who committed the crime. The person who comes forward, reassured by an investigation anonymity order, will not necessarily have to give evidence at the trial. They might then be able to remain anonymous, having assisted in bringing to justice a serious criminal who might not otherwise have been brought to justice. That is the purpose. We would not seek to make more investigation anonymity orders than were necessary to assist people to come forward with evidence that might help solve crimes. It is essentially a reassurance.

Edward Garnier: There is a great deal in what both my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth and the Minister have said, but there may be a confusion in the Ministers mind. She partly answered the question, but she used the word evidence. The subsection uses information. There is a world of difference between information and evidence. That may sound overly technical, but it is clear to us that there is a real distinction.
I rather agree with my hon. Friend. If the Minister does not want to spray around investigation anonymity orders, we need higher hurdles or stricter tests in order to prevent that. Surely it would be better and in line with the Governments policyI think that my hon. Friend would agreeto use what I call an unless test rather than the balance of probabilities test outlined in subsection (8).
Under such a test, the person specified in the order would have to be able to provide information that would assist the criminal investigation, and it would have to be the case that they would not give it unless the order were made. We then come to the discussion about the distinction between information and evidence, but surely, if the Minister is right about not wanting to spray the orders around, we must not give them automatically: All right, Id rather have one, and then Ill be very helpful. We need to be disciplined about it.

Maria Eagle: I understand the point that the hon. and learned Gentleman is making. I probably did mean to say information rather than evidence. We are talking about the early stagepossibly the very early stageof an investigation into a serious crime. Information may appear to be important evidence when it is given and end up not being important at all by the time the investigation is completed. We are talking about information that might end up as evidence. I accept that point.
In that sense, it is a matter of pragmatism for the investigatorsthe police, in most instancesto follow their investigatory prowess in getting what information they can in a particular set of circumstances. We can be pragmatic about it because we are discussing not trials but investigations, which might or might not lead to charges, justice being done and individuals who have committed homicide being caught. We hope that they will lead to those things, but they might not. We do not need to start applying at that early stage the kind of tough judicial test that one would expect to be met in trials.
We are trying to assist those who have information to feel able to come forward with it and give it to the police. An assurance from the police that their anonymity will be retained may facilitate that process in the circumstances of gun and knife homicide in gang-infested hotspots where we know that there is a problem. Those are particular circumstances, and we need to retain pragmatism on the part of the police. Those of us who have been involved in trials of various kinds should not become too legalistic about precisely what the test ought to be. We are simply trying to reassure those who have information that might be relevant to a gun or knife homicide in a gang-infested area, to come forward and give information that they otherwise might not provide. I believe that we should be relatively pragmatic about that.

Jeremy Wright: The Minister is broadening out my point beyond where I intended it to go. I am asking what subsection (8)(b) adds. I do not suggest that an investigation anonymity order should be available to everyone whenever they want it, because the rest of the clause deals with other restrictions on the issuing of such orders. It is hard to conceive of anyone who would not be more likely to give information if they have anonymity than if they do not. I wonder why we need the subsection.

Maria Eagle: Most people might prefer to have anonymity than not have it, but there are some tough, robust characters out therewe have all met themwho are willing to come forward at any time if they feel that that will help to rid their area of what they acknowledge to be a problem. This measure might not make a difference to such individuals, who would come forward anyway. I do not believe that it is a killer one way or the otherif you will forgive the terrible pun, Mr. Cook.
Let me deal with the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough who tabled the amendments, and by the hon. Member for Cambridge about the strange definition of gang. That is an attempt to define a gang in a way that, although it appears odd on first reading, is based on evidence and seems to work as well as any other way.
Police working in these areas know from intelligence and their own experiences what is going on and who these people are. Analysis of 770 known gang members across London, Liverpool, Manchester and Birminghamfour of the hot-spot areas where this kind of problem has taken a holdhas shown that 97 per cent. are under the age of 30. That confirms the anecdotal evidence provided by the hon. Member for Cambridge and the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, who have been visiting prisons and have noticed the ages involved. Studies indicate that their anecdotal evidence is accurate; the average age of gang members is 20.
Half the total number of gun and gang homicides are estimated to have been committed by those aged 11 to 29. A study of gun crime in Manchester showed that overall, the most serious injuries were associated with shootings in which gang members were involved. Eighty per cent. of deaths and 70 per cent. of the most serious injuries result from shootings that involved gang members. Such evidence has led us to believe that by using what appear to be somewhat strange definitions, we will catch the mischief that we intend to catch. I assure the Committee that that is based not only on anecdote and assumption, but on research and study.
The hon. and learned Gentleman made a point about numberstwo and one; I will not rehearse his point. We do not believe that it will be necessary to show that all members of a group appeared to engage in criminal activitiesonly a sufficient number to indicate the existence of a discernible group, which is more than one person, with at least one involved in criminal activity. That is the explanation. It is also not necessary to show that members of a group engaged in criminal activities together, as long as we can show that there is a gang and that somebody has committed an offence.
I hope that those explanations have helped, and that the hon. and learned Gentleman will be satisfied enough to withdraw his amendment.

Edward Garnier: Yes, I will, if the Committee gives me permission to do so. The answer to this might well lie in guidelines. If that is the case, perhaps the Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions might find it appropriate to issue guidelines to the police about how to carry out these sorts of investigations.
I am always acutely conscious of the different experience in our constituencies: I have been concerned about that point for the past 10 years or so. I remember listening to the right hon. Member for Salford (Hazel Blears), who, as a Back Bencher, when we were discussing the legislation to do with antisocial behaviour orders and other related criminal offences in the 1997 Parliament, described in a speech the criminal statistics for her constituency in a fortnight. Those statistics were the same as those in my constituency for a decade. It is important that we understand the different experiences in our constituencies. The problems that affect the estates in the constituencies of the right hon. Members for Salford and for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East, and those of other hon. Members, may be rather different from those that affect the sort of estates that my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk and I represent. I am not unaware of the patchwork quilt that is England and Wales and how our different constituency experiences influence our approach to these discussions.
I gained some experience of this matter both through my practice at the Bar and through my work as a shadow Minister visiting prisons. I was told by the governor of one prison in Surrey that there was a gang in there called the DSN gang. I said, What on earth does that mean? He said it was the Dont Say Nothing gang, which works on the streets of inner London. That gang works in prison and outside it and has controllers inside and outside. The prison authorities do their best to break up and mitigate the consequences of gangs existing inside prisons, but it is inevitable that the gangs manage to do a lot of bad work inside prison, just as they do outside.
Committee members should not think that, because Conservatives sometimes represent different places we do not understand that gangland warfare and misbehaviour are a big problem across England and Wales. We do know that and we agree with the Government that something sensible needs to be done about it. We are edging towards an agreed route down which to travel to prevent these terrible happenings occurring. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 277, in clause 63, page 38, line 1, leave out willing to assist or as having assisted and insert
a person who is or was able or willing to assist.(Maria Eagle.)

Clause 63, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64

Appeal against refusal of order

Maria Eagle: I beg to move amendment 278, in clause 64, page 38, line 32, leave out subsection (5) and insert
(5) The judge to whom an appeal is made must consider afresh the application for an investigation anonymity order and section 62(3) to (5) applies accordingly to the determination of the application by the judge.
(6) In the application of section 62(5) by virtue of subsection (5), the reference in section 62(5) to the designated officer in relation to a justice of the peace is to be read
(a) in the case of an appeal made in England and Wales, as a reference to the appropriate officer of the Crown Court;
(b) in the case of an appeal made in Northern Ireland, as a reference to the chief clerk of the county court division in which the appeal is made..
This minor amendment is simply about making it clear that appeals against a refusal to grant an investigation anonymity order, as provided for in the clause, may be dealt with on the papers, because an oral re-hearing will not be necessary in every case.

Amendment 278 agreed to.

Clause 64, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 65

Discharge of order

Maria Eagle: I beg to move amendment 279, in clause 65, page 39, line 3, leave out may and insert is entitled to.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 280 to 284.

Maria Eagle: We would normally expect an investigation anonymity order to remain in force indefinitely. However, there may, on occasion, be circumstances in which an order should no longer remain in force. Clause 65 therefore allows a justice of the peace to discharge an investigation anonymity order if it seems appropriate to do so in the light of changed circumstances. However, it does not follow that because circumstances change, the order should or must be discharged. For example, we would not want an order to be discharged just because it subsequently comes to light that the ages of most of the gang members are outside the prescribed age limitsome of the 3 per cent. It may be appropriate in such cases that the order remains in force.

Tim Boswell: Perhaps it would be helpful if the Minister explained the articulation between the investigation anonymity order and the upcoming witness anonymity order, because they are presumably not the same. If the evidence is sound for one, will it be applicable to the second, and what will the transition process be, if required?

Maria Eagle: With your indulgence, Mr. Cook, I will deal with that briefly. They are certainly not the same. The main difference is that the investigation anonymity order is available on appropriate application to a JP or the court at an early stageperhaps before anyone has been arrested, or immediately after the crime has been committedto bring forth information from members of the public who may feel unable to give the information or to tell the police what they saw or what they know without the extra reassurance of anonymity protection in the limited circumstances that we have discussed.
The witness anonymity order is about what happens at trial when someone has been charged and criminal proceedings have started. It protects the identity of a witness who is giving evidence at the trial, and a separate application must be made to the court. There are similarities, but one does not imply the other. When the police give assurances to the giver of information at an early stage of the investigation, they cannot guarantee that a witness anonymity order would be made if evidence were required to be given at trial, because there is not necessarily a causal link between them. They are separate processes. One is to bring forward information, and the other is to protect identity at trial.
Because of the importance of what is involved, the clause grants a right of appeal to the Crown court against the JPs decision. Pending the outcome of the appeal, Government amendment 282 requires a justice to delay the discharge of the investigation anonymity order because, clearly, if the beneficiary of the order is opposed to it being discharged, one would not want it to be so discharged before an appeal had been heard. The clause pays close attention to the rights and interests of the witness or information giver, and it may be that person who wants the order to be discharged.
Subsection (2)(c) specifically permits the recipient of the order to apply for a discharge. Subsection (4) grants the witness or information giverit is probably better to refer to the information giver to avoid confusion with the witness anonymity orderdiscretion to be party to any application for discharge by the police or other authority who might have applied for the order in the first place. In accordance with Government amendment 280, a JP may not discharge the order unless the person concerned has had the opportunity to oppose such an application, or it was not reasonably practicable to communicate with the beneficiary of the order to alert them that an application for discharge was being made.
Subsection (5) enables the beneficiary of the order to appeal against a JPs decision, whether the application for discharge is made by the enforcement authority, or the beneficiary of the order, and whether the decision is to grant or to refuse the application. Those are safeguards to ensure that the person whose anonymity has been guaranteed in respect of the order has a full chance to oppose it or to appeal. The intention is to protect the individual concerned.
The clause allows the prosecutor, as well as the person who applied for the order, to apply for discharge. It might well be that if everybody agrees that discharge is a good idea, it is appropriate for the prosecutor to deal with the application, rather than leave it to the individual who has been the beneficiary of the order. That is the substance of the amendments. They would tidy things up and make sure that there are no procedural slips that would allow somebodys identity to become known before the discharge has been made, if there is to be a discharge.

Henry Bellingham: The Government amendments are logical and sensible, but why were they not included in the original Bill? When the Bill was being discussed, it had been around for a while and the Department has had a long time to prepare it. I refer to one important amendment in particular.
The Government are introducing quite a few amendments at this stage. Those amendments are neither in response to what was discussed on Second Reading, nor to representations made by either the official Opposition or the Liberal Democrats. Will the Minister enlighten the Committee about where the amendments are coming from and why the Bill was not 100 per cent. right the first time? Of course, it must be got 100 per cent. right and I take on board the point that she has made that it is a moving target and we are talking about work in progress. However, one of the amendments in particular is an important one and it is surprising, to say the least, that it was not included in the original Bill.

David Howarth: I have only one question: why do the amendments not include even more protection for the person who is the subject of the order? One would have thought that if one were moving in that direction, one would go so far even to say that the order should not be discharged without the persons consent. Given what was said in the previous debate about trying to use the orders to give people confidence that their names will not be made known to the offenders, any risk that their name might come out without their consent would put people off coming forward in the first place.

Maria Eagle: In response to the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, these processes are not prefect, as he accepted. We thought things through to get the basic position right, and we thought that we had got it right, but we had not anticipated that the orders would be discharged. An individual might want the order discharged and there could be a set of circumstances in which it would be more appropriate for it to be discharged. It is in relation to those circumstances that we have ended up with Government amendments of this nature.
I will not suggest that the process is perfect. Those of us, including the hon. Member for Daventry, who have had ministerial experience, know that nothing is ever perfect in ministerial or legislative life. We do our best and we sometimes have to produce amendments, which has been done with the aim of trying to dot the is and cross the ts. People have come up with fairly unlikely sets of circumstances that might be presented to the magistrate dealing with these issues, and we have tried, through an iterative process, to get rid of the potential difficulties. One suspects that such a situation will always occur as we reflect further and look at what we have in the Bill. We do our best to minimise such a situation occurring, but Ministers have to hold their hands up to it when it does.

Tim Boswell: As the Minister kindly and graciously mentioned me, perhaps she would like to bear in mind the awful warning of her colleague, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the right hon. Member for Redditch (Jacqui Smith), who, when introducing an education Bill, boasted all the way through that she would not accept any amendments, and she did notalthough we had some lively discussions. However, in the end, she was defeated by the fact that it had been introduced in another place and so she had to table a privilege amendment to send it back to that place. However hard one tries, one is not going to get it right. We understand and appreciate the spirit of the Ministers response to our concerns about these issues.
Maria Eaglerose

Edward Garnier: The lesson that I draw from the Ministers comments is that she would like the Bill to be broken up into six or seven discrete Bills so that she would have much more time to get the subject matter right in each. I am sure that that is what she really meant.

Maria Eagle: The hon. and learned Gentleman is over-interpreting what I said. I was trying to tell the Committee about my practical experience of ministerial life, which the hon. Member for Daventry will understand. There is never enough legislative time to have as many Bills as we, as legislators, would like, but we do our best with what we have. The formulation suggested by the hon. Member for Cambridge would have been another, perhaps more elegant way of achieving what we want, and I will have to think about it, although it may have disadvantages that are not at the forefront of my mind at present. In any event, we try to do our best.

Amendment 279 agreed to.

Amendments made: 280, in clause 65, page 39, line 4, at end insert
( ) If an application to discharge an investigation anonymity order is made by a person other than the person specified in the order, the justice may not determine the application unless
(a) the person specified in the order has had an opportunity to oppose the application, or
(b) the justice is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to communicate with the person..
Amendment 281, in clause 65, page 39, line 5, after second to, insert a judge of.
Amendment 282, in clause 65, page 39, line 7, leave out subsection (6) and insert
(6) If during the proceedings a party indicates an intention to appeal against a determination to discharge the investigation anonymity order, a justice of the peace who makes such a determination must provide for the discharge of the order not to have effect until the appeal is determined or otherwise disposed of..(Maria Eagle.)

Clause 65, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 66

Delegation of functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Edward Garnier: I have a brief question for the Minister. The clause deals with the delegation of functions of chief officers of police in various organisations, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director of Revenue and Customs ProsecutionsI will not go through the whole list, as it is set out in subsections (1) to (7). Would it not be sensible for somebody to tell us, either in the Bill or in some other publicly available document, precisely to whom it is thought appropriate that such senior officials should delegate their functions?

Maria Eagle: We would normally expect them to be delegated to personnel in the same organisation, such as specialist investigators or prosecutors, and that is certainly the intention.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 67 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 68

Interpretation

Amendments made: 283, in clause 68, page 40, line 17, leave out paragraph (b).
Amendment 284, in clause 68, page 40, leave out line 19 and insert
references to a judge of the Crown Court are to be read as references.(Maria Eagle.)

Clause 68, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 69 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 70

Applications

Edward Garnier: I beg to move amendment 377, in clause 70, page 41, line 14, at end insert
(1A) An application for a witness anonymity order to be made in relation to a witness in a coroners inquest may be made to the coroner with the coroners permission by any party appearing at the inquest..

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 378, in clause 70, page 42, line 2, at end insert
(9) Where an application either for permission to make an application for a witness anonymity order or for a witness anonymity order is made to a coroner by a party appearing at an inquest that party
(a) must (unless the coroner directs otherwise) inform the coroner of the identity of the witness, but
(b) is not required to disclose in connection with the application
(i) the identity of the witness, or
(ii) any information that may enable the witness to be identified,
to any other party to the proceedings or his or her legal representatives..
Amendment 380, in clause 70, page 42, line 2, at end insert
(9) The provisions set out in subsections (4) to (8) inclusive apply as appropriate to applications to a coroner as they do to applications in criminal cases..
Amendment 381, in clause 71, page 42, line 5, after proceedings, insert or an inquest.
Amendment 383, in clause 71, page 42, line 15, after trial, insert
or the inquest being conducted in a manner consistent with the interests of the parties before it being treated fairly..
Amendment 384, in clause 72, page 42, line 33, after proceedings, insert
or a party appearing at an inquest.
Amendment 385, in clause 72, page 42, line 39, after defendant, insert
or resolving the issues in the inquest.
Amendment 386, in clause 72, page 43, line 1, after case, insert or inquest.
Amendment 387, in clause 72, page 43, line 4, after defendant, insert
, or the witness and any party appearing at the inquest or any associates of any party appearing at the inquest.
Amendment 388, in clause 72, page 43, line 9, after indictment, insert or at an inquest.
Amendment 389, in clause 73, page 43, line 12, after second judge, insert or coroner.
Amendment 390, in clause 73, page 43, line 14, after defendant, insert
or a party appearing at the inquest.
Amendment 391, in clause 74, page 43, line 18, after proceedings, insert or inquest.
Amendment 392, in clause 74, page 43, line 31, after second proceedings, insert or party appearing at the inquest.
Amendment 393, in clause 75, page 43, line 41, after first proceedings, insert or at an inquest.
Amendment 394, in clause 75, page 44, line 18, after defendant, insert or a party appearing.
Amendment 395, in clause 76, page 44, line 28, after second proceedings), insert or an inquest.
Amendment 396, in clause 76, page 44, line 33, at end insert or
(c) the verdict or any finding of fact or law by the coroner or inquest jury, as the case may be, is reviewed by the appeal court..
Amendment 397, in clause 76, page 44, line 41, after proceedings, insert or appearing at the inquest.
Amendment 398, in clause 76, page 45, line 3, after proceedings, insert
or a party appearing at the inquest.
Amendment 374, in clause 80, page 45, line 34, after court,, insert a coroners court,.
Amendment 376, in clause 80, page 46, line 1, after court,, insert a coroners court,.

Edward Garnier: Although this group of amendments looks quite large, they all have one purpose: to apply the witness anonymity orders regime, which is currently applicable under the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 and which, if the Bill is enacted, will be folded through into criminal procedure in the Crown courts and magistrates courts, to coroners inquests. If witness anonymity procedures need to be applied in the Crown courtwe saw this in the de Menezes casesurely they are sometimes likely to be needed in coroners inquests. The amendments are therefore designed to apply the procedure for applications in clause 70, which currently applies to criminal proceedings, to those touching on coroners inquests.

David Howarth: I do not want to reopen a previous debate, but new clause 10, which we considered during the juryless inquests debate, would have had a similar effect to the hon. and learned Gentlemans proposals, but in very limited circumstances. The difference between his proposals and ours is that his would make the availability of anonymous witnesses a general power of coroners courts, whereas ours would have provided for a more limited set of circumstances in which that might happen. Nevertheless, that difference is not a great one and there seems to me to be no obvious argument why anonymous witnesses should not be allowed in coroners courts in the same way as in the criminal courts. I ask the Ministers to explain why, throughout our debates about anonymous witnesses, there was a concentration on the adversarial process of the criminal courts when in fact anonymity is often more useful in the circumstance that we are currently discussing than in criminal cases.

Maria Eagle: The short answer is that provisions for anonymity are allowed in the coroners courts. I will give a little more explanation than that, but members of the Committee and especially those who were involved in considering the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 will recall that the Davis judgment in the House of Lords, which gave rise to the necessity for that legislation because it struck down the common law rules or had a very different interpretation of the common law than had been thought to exist previously, related only to criminal proceedings. We believe that it is unnecessary to make provision for coroners courts in the same way.
The Davis judgment helps us in this respect. Their lordships distinguished between coroners inquests and criminal proceedings. They made it clear that their judgment applied only to criminal proceedings. They referred to a 1992 case in which the House had previously approved the admission of anonymous written witness statements into an inquest. It is also clear that coroners have an inherent power to regulate their own proceedings, including permitting a witness to remain anonymous or give evidence from behind a screen, and they do. We therefore believe that the amendments are unnecessary and that applying the regime that has been designed to work in the criminal courts is unnecessary in the inquisitorial system. In that sense, their lordships, in the Davis judgment, agreed.
There are differences between inquisitorial proceedings and criminal proceedings. There is no indictment, no prosecution, no defence and no trial at an inquest. The procedures and rules of evidence suitable for a trial are unsuitable for an inquest. There is no accused likely to be convicted and punished. In addition, the powers of the coroner to control the admission of evidence anonymously are being enhanced elsewhere in the Bill. The amendments are not, therefore, helpful; in fact, they might confuse things. Coroners will be able to give a direction in accordance with rules made under clause 34(2)(e) requiring a name or other matter not to be disclosed except to persons specified in that direction.

David Howarth: I thank the Minister very much for putting on the record something that I think was mentioned only in passing when we discussed new clause 10. Can she explain why the Secretary of State, when discussing juryless inquests, insisted that the main reason for them was, in his view, that the identities of agents and so on might come out in an inquest in a way that would not happen in a trial?

Maria Eagle: I did not deal with that part of the Bill, so I do not know precisely why the case that was discussed at length earlier in the Bills passage is different. The Under-Secretary, my hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice), might know more about that. Nor do I know whether transferring the criminal procedures under discussion into the coronial system would help. I do not believe that it would, because anonymity has been available in inquests such as the de Menezes inquest in which the coroner has thought that it would be of use.

The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).

Adjourned till this day at One oclock.